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SHELTERING VICTIMS:
THE NEED FOR REGULATIONS IN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASYLUM LAW
"Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to be free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!",
INTRODUCTION
At its most basic, asylum is defined as "sanctuary or shelter." 2
Asylum and refugee status, as currently accepted in interna-
tional law, first emerged in 1951 when the newly formed United
Nations ("U.N.") attempted to address the problem of
thousands of displaced persons from World War II.3 The Refu-
gee Convention outlined the definition of refugee, the state pro-
tections provided to refugees, and the obligations of those who
qualified for assistance.4 As the number of refugees without
country protection grew, an additional protocol passed in 1967
1 Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, in POETRY X, Sep. 4 2006, http://
poetry.poetryx.com/poems/15028/.
2 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
3 Asylum Law, Asylum Seekers and Refugees: A Primer, TRAC IMMIGRA-
TION, http://trac.syr.edulimmigration/reports/161/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
"Refugee" is the designation of a person seeking protection of another state
under the refugee convention. Asylum is the process by which a person ap-
plies for protection within a country's borders. All asylees may be defined as
refugees, but a separate system exists for those applying for protection
outside of the destination country. See id.
4 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; UNHCR, The
1951 Convention: Questions and Answers, U.N. Doc UNHCR / MRPI / Q&A
A*l / ENG 8 (September 2007) [hereinafter The 1951 Refugee Convention],
available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47a7078dd.html.
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expanded the scope of the original convention, eliminating re-
strictions on geography and time.5
The body of asylum and refugee law has grown significantly
since the passage of the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Pro-
tocol. In 2008, over 800,000 individuals applied for refugee sta-
tus worldwide, of which nearly 400,000 were women and girls.6
An estimated 49,600 asylum or refugee claims were filed in the
United States that year, making it the second most popular des-
tination for those seeking protection in foreign states.7 While
many women seek asylum on bases unrelated to gender or gen-
der violence, gender related asylum claims (including, but not
limited to, genital mutilation, sexual violence, and domestic vio-
lence) fall within both the definitions of asylum eligibility out-
lined in the Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol.8
Additionally, these gender grounds have been formally ac-
knowledged as potential bases for protection in the United
States since 1995.9
One type of gender asylum that can be difficult for applicants
to attain in the United States is asylum arising out of domestic
violence. The U.N. High Commission on Refugees
("UNHCR") and many countries around the world recognize
extreme domestic violence as a potential basis for asylum.10 De-
5 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31,
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]; The 1951
Refugee Convention, supra note 4.
6 UNHCR, 2008 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, In-
ternally Displaced and Stateless Persons, Country Data Sheets, 2 (June 16,
2009), http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.pdf.
7 South Africa is the primary destination worldwide with nearly four times as
many asylum seekers as the United States. Id. at 15.
8 Amnesty Int'l, Violence Against Women: A Fact Sheet, http://www.amnesty
usa.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/vaw-fact sheet.pdf.
9 INS Asylum Gender Guideline: Fact Sheet (May 26, 1995), available at
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=13813.
10 See Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, (Austra-
lia 2002) 76 A.L.J.R.667, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
federalct/2002/574.html; Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't,
(United Kingdom 1999) 2 All E.R. 546, available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ldl99899/ldjudgmt/jd990325/islam0l.htm; Refugee Appeal
No. 71427/99 (New Zealand 1999), available at http://www.refugee.org.nz/
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spite this growing global consensus, and widespread advocacy at
many levels in the United States, a consistent United States pol-
icy providing eligibility for those domestic violence victims who
meet all other statutory requirements is not yet established. A
number of developments under the Obama administration, in-
cluding an April 2009 Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") brief;" a landmark 7th Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion by Judge Posner;12 the December 2009 decision to grant do-
mestic violence victim Rodi Alvarado asylum after a ten year
fight;13 and subsequent grants of asylum in local offices, seem to
indicate that the status "victim of extreme domestic violence" is
receiving more positive attention from the administration and
circuit courts than in recent years. Despite what appears to be a
shift in the United States' attitude regarding asylum claims aris-
ing from domestic violence, revised asylum regulations develop-
ing the definition and interpretation of "social group" are
necessary to ensure consistent and equitable hearings for do-
mestic violence victims now and under future administrations.14
Part II of this Comment traces the case law, proposed regula-
tions, and international guidelines applying to the adjudication
of domestic violence asylum claims.15 Part III looks at the di-
verging and sometimes conflicting requirements proposed by
those approaches and analyzes their effectiveness and
Fulltext/71427-99.htm; UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gen-
der-Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the Refugee
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N.
Doc HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) [hereinafter Gender Guidelines].
11 Department of Homeland Security's Supplemental Brief at 8-10, Matter
of L-R-, (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Supplemental Brief], available at
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716-asylum-brief.pdf.
12 Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2009).
13 Paul Elias, Domestic Violence Victim Granted Asylum in US, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2009/12/
18/domesticviolencevictim-grantedasylumjin_us/.
14 Because Agency Law is highly dependent on the Executive Branch for
both direction and levels of enforcement, without codification positions on
definitions and approaches can change every four years with the presidential
cycle.
15 See infra notes 22-197 and accompanying text.
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equitability in regulating domestic violence asylum claims.16
Part IV addresses the impact of the most recent developments
in domestic violence asylum on current and future cases and the
challenges in continuing those developments. It then proposes
that the Obama administration introduce comprehensive regula-
tions issued by executive order designed to provide consistent
policy direction for future applicants.'7 Part V concludes that
without such regulations or other legislative action, an equitable
approach to domestic violence and asylum claims will never
arise, potentially resulting in thousands of needlessly rejected
asylum applications due to the ambiguity of the legal
standards.'8
II. BACKGROUND
This Part discusses how asylum claims for victims of domestic
violence have been addressed in the past. It looks first to the
general requirements for asylum identified in international and
domestic law and the framework in which domestic violence and
other gender related claims are addressed.19 It then identifies
the major case law, international norms, and previously pro-
posed regulations in this area, tracing the differences among
these approaches.20
A. United States' Asylum Law and Domestic Violence
In 1968, the United States signed the 1967 Protocol, acceding
to the 1951 Convention as well.21 The United States then codi-
fied the 1967 Protocol in the 1980 Refugee Act, requiring that
asylum applicants meet the guidelines established by the United
16 See infra notes 198-243 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 239-52 and accompanying text.
18 See infra Part V.
19 See infra Part II.A.
20 See infra Parts II.B-I.
21 See Refugee Convention, supra note 4. The Protocol was ratified October
4, 1968, and signed by the President on October 15, 1968. See 1967 Protocol,
supra note 5.
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Nations.22 According to the Refugee Act, a refugee is an indi-
vidual outside his own country who is unable or unwilling to
return to that country because of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of one of the five protected
grounds: race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.23 This definition of a refugee
requires persecution or feared persecution (1) on account of (2)
a protected ground, through (3) state action (including being un-
willing or unable to stop or prevent persecution by private
actors.)24
New regulations governing the adjudication of asylum claims
were established in 1990.25 Under current regulations, asylum
claims are adjudicated before two federal agencies. The Depart-
ment of Justice ("DOJ") oversees the Executive Office for Im-
migration Review ("EOIR") including the immigration courts
and the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), which review
"defensive" asylum applications.26 DHS decides asylum cases
for applicants not in removal proceedings through the Bureau of
United States Citizenship and Immigrations Services ("USCIS")
sometimes referred to as "affirmative" asylum applications.27
Domestic violence victims who wish to seek asylum in the
United States avail themselves of the same options available to
other applicants. Women already present in the United States,
but not in removal proceedings, may file an affirmative applica-
22 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2006).
23 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006); see also 1967 Protocol, supra note 5;
Refugee Convention, supra note 4.
24 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
25 Aliens and Nationality, Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Proce-
dures, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674-01 (July 27, 1990). Current regulations governing
asylum are codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208 (2009).
26 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.0-1003.1 (2009). For an overview of the system, its struc-
ture and flow, and a discussion of affirmative vs. defensive asylum, see
The Asylum Process, TRAC IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/
reports/159/.
27 8 C.F.R. § 208.14. Regulations prior to 1996 referred to "removal" as "de-
portation," a phrase still commonly used.
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tion with USCIS.28 Women who are in removal proceedings
before an immigration judge may apply for asylum as a defense
to removal by filing an application at that time.29 Those individ-
uals in removal proceedings due to a failed asylum application
may also renew their claim in immigration court.30 Women pre-
sent at a port of entry who do not have the documents necessary
to be admitted to the United States may begin the asylum pro-
cess by indicating a fear of returning to their home country.3 1
The DHS Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
will refer such cases to USCIS for preliminary assessment of the
asylum claim (called a "credible fear interview").32 Anyone de-
termined to have a credible fear of persecution is placed in re-
moval proceedings, where she may then file an asylum
application with the immigration court.33
A key piece of the refugee status 3 4 is its basis on one of the
five protected grounds: race, religion, national origin, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion. In seeking
asylum, women have used all of the protected grounds in their
applications, but the ground most often cited for gender or do-
28 8 C.F.R §§ 208.2(a), 208.4(b). At this point, the USCIS regional service
center performs initial processing and sends the application to the local asy-
lum office. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(b)(1). An asylum officer then interviews the
applicant in a non-adversarial proceeding. 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(b). If an appli-
cant is determined to be eligible for asylum, the officer has the authority to
grant asylum at that time. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(b). If the asylum officer finds
that an applicant appears ineligible for asylum, and there is no other lawful
immigration status, the officer must forward the case to an immigration
judge. 8 C.F.R § 208.14(c)(1).
29 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b).
30 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c)(1).
31 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4).
32 Id.
33 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f). If an applicant fails to prove to the asylum officer
that she has a credible fear of persecution, she may have the determination
reviewed by an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(g)(1)-(2). If the appli-
cant declines review, or the immigration judge also determines that the appli-
cant does not have a credible fear, she will be removed from the United
States. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(g)(1)(ii).
34 An asylee is different from a refugee in that he applies for protection once
he arrives in a country, although asylees must meet the refugee definition to
qualify for asylum.
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mestic violence applications is "membership in a particular so-
cial group."3 5 Since 1985, the BIA and lower immigration courts
have overwhelmingly followed Matter of Acosta, which defines
membership in a particular social group as "an immutable char-
acteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an
individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity
or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed."36
Despite the fact that the Acosta court found sex3 7 to be an
immutable characteristic, 38 a "gender plus" approach requiring
additional factors is used to construct social group in most gen-
der claims.39 While some circuits have recognized that gender
alone can define a social group, 40 it is not the majority opinion.
UNHCR also accepts gender alone as defining a social group,
stating that "women may constitute a particular social group
under certain circumstances based on the common characteristic
of sex, whether or not they associate with one another based on
that shared characteristic." 41 Refugee status can be elusive in
3s See Shoafera v. INS, 228 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000); Lopez-Galarza v.
INS, 99 F.3d 954, 959-60 (9th Cir. 1996); Surita v. INS, 95 F.3d 814, 819-20
(9th Cir. 1996); Lazano-Majano v. INS, 813 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1987),
overruled on other grounds by Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996);
Amanda Blanck, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum Status: A Human
Rights Approach, 22 WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 47, 57 (2000).
36 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), modified on other
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
37 According to the guidelines on gender published by the UNHCR, "Gen-
der refers to the relationship between women and men based on socially or
culturally constructed and defined identities, status, roles and responsibilities
that are assigned to one sex or another, while sex is a biological determina-
tion." Gender Guidelines, supra note 10, at 1 2. Despite this, many of the
cases and texts involving gender asylum and/or domestic violence asylum use
the terms sex and gender interchangeably. This is partially due to the fact
that in many cases an applicant's sex affects the gender or social group claim.
38 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
39 See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 64 (2nd Cir. 2006), vacated, Keisler v.
Hong Yin Gao, 552 U.S. 801 (2007).
40 See, e.g,. Mohamed v. Gonzales, 400 F. 3d 785, 796-798 (9th Cir. 2005)
(females in general may constitute a social group); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233,
1240 (3d Cir. 1993).
41 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Membership in a Partic-
ular Social Group, 15, U.N. Doc HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Social Group Guidelines].
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the United States for women who rely on sex or gender as their
sole ground for relief.42 Here, the proposed social group must
have the shared characteristic of gender along with additional
shared characteristics to create a sufficiently identifiable sub-
set.4 3 This often results in meticulously constructed definitions
of social group that attempt to strike a balance between being
too broad (and thus not being sufficiently identifiable) and too
narrow (not having enough shared characteristics).
Another important factor of the refugee definition for bat-
tered women focuses on the motivation for the persecution.
Since the 1992 Supreme Court decision in INS v. Zacarias, the
United States has mandated that the persecution in question be
motivated by one of the five protected grounds, such as political
opinion or social group.44 The harm need not require a "puni-
tive or malignant intent." It can be linked to benign perceptions
as long as there is a connection between the motive and the per-
secution that occurred or will occur. 4 5 This motivation require-
ment (that applicants show some piece of direct or
circumstantial evidence that the persecution claimed was moti-
vated by a protected ground) is much more limited than ap-
proaches in other countries and in international guidelines,
making it more difficult for asylees in the United States to meet
the definition.46
42 See Linda Kelly, Republican Mothers, Bastards' Fathers and Good Victims:
Discarding Citizens and Equal Protection Through the Failures of Legal
Images, 51 HASTINGs L.J. 557, 590-91 (2000) (asserting that "sex could be
sufficient to define a social group" but women need additional characteristics
because it is problematic to argue that gender motivates violence against
women); Lori Nessel, "Willful Blindness" to Gender-Based Violence Abroad:
United States' Implementation of Article Three of the United Nations Conven-
tion Against Torture, 89 MINN. L.R. 71, 76 (2004) ("[Tlhe United States ex-
cludes social groups based solely on sex and requires strong evidence that the
claimant's membership in a 'gender-plus' protected group served as the pri-
mary motivation for the persecutor's conduct.").
43 See Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d at 64.
44 INS v. Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992).
45 Karen Musalo, Revisiting Social Group and Nexus in Gender Asylum
Claims: A Unifying Rationale for Evolving Jurisprudence, 52 DePaul L. Rev.
777, 800-01 (2003).
46 Id. at 785.
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The final component of the refugee definition requires that
the persecution suffered must be the result of state action or
inaction. Like the term "particular social group," persecution is
not defined in the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, or the
Refugee Act-instead, individual courts are left to determine
whether harm meets the necessary standard. 4 7 In domestic vio-
lence cases, the harm is typically perpetuated by a non-State ac-
tor such as a husband or father, and as a result is sometimes
considered a private harm not eligible for asylum.4 8 In countries
such as France and Germany actions by private actors can never
satisfy this standard. 49 Other nations such as Australia,5 0 the
United Kingdom,5 1 and New Zealand52 have adopted motiva-
tion rationales that allow for actions by non-state actors when
there is a failure of the state to provide protection from persecu-
tion based on one of the five protected grounds.5 3 In the United
States, this approach has a mixed history-followed in the 1996
Matter of Kasinga,54 rejected in the 1999 Matter of R-A- 5 5-and
47 The BIA defines persecution as "the infliction of harm or suffering by a
government, or persons a government is unwilling or unable to control, to
overcome a characteristic of the victim." In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357,
365 (B.I.A. 1996) (citing Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 222-23).
48 Michael G.Heyman, Protecting Foreign Victims of Domestic Violence: An
Analysis of Asylum Regulations, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y 115,
122-23 (2008).
49 Musalo, supra note 45, at 782.
50 Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar, (Australia
2002) 76 A.L.J.R.667, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/
federal ct/2002/574.html.
51 Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, (United Kingdom 1999) 2
All E.R. 546, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ldl99899/
Idjudgmt/jd990325/islam01.htm.
52 Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 (New Zealand 1999), available at http://
www.refugee.org.nz/Fulltext/71427-99.htm.
53 This is referred to as the bifurcated approach, which can be described as
Persecution = Serious Harm + Failure of State Protection. The bifurcated
approach looks not only to the motives of the persecutor, but also the "socie-
tal and State factors in the equation." Musalo, supra note 45, at 779.
54 Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996).
55 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001, B.I.A. 1999).
53
has not been widely recognized (even after R-A- was vacated by
the Attorney General).56
B. Matter of R-A-: The Case of Rodi Alvarado
The case of Rodi Alvarado stretched over ten years, three ad-
ministrations, four attorney generals, and countless filings and
court appearances. Perhaps the most widely recognized domes-
tic violence asylum case in the United States, Matter of R-A-
serves as an example of the vagaries and inconsistencies result-
ing from a lack of clear guidance and shows how the immigra-
tion system handles cases involving battered women. In 1999,
the BIA reviewed the asylum case of Rodi Alvarado, a Guate-
malan domestic violence victim, and reversed the immigration
judge's initial grant of asylum.57 Alvarado had experienced ex-
treme violence and abuse from her husband including disloca-
tion of her jaw when she missed her menstrual period, violent
kicks to her spine when she would not abort her fetus, whipping
with an electrical cord, and threats to put her in a wheelchair if
she ever tried to leave him.5 8 The immigration judge in the case,
ruled that Alvarado's harm rose to the level of persecution and
resulted from her membership in a social group defined by
"Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with
Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to
live under male domination."59
56 See Musalo, supra note 45, at 778.
57 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 908-09. If an asylum determination made
by a USCIS officer is appealed by either party, the case moves to immigra-
tion court and is heard in front of an immigration judge. Challenges to immi-
gration judge rulings (whether they are de novo or review of application
determinations) are then reviewed by the BIA. Decisions from the BIA may
be appealed to federal circuit courts, and as far as the United States Supreme
Court in some cases. Because immigration review is an agency process under
the DOJ, the U.S. Attorney General has the power to vacate BIA decisions,
remand cases (either to the Attorney General, the BIA, or immigration
court), and stay cases as necessary.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 911. See also Haley Schaffer, Domestic Violence and Asylum in the
United States: In re R-A-, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 779, 788-89 (2001).
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On review, the BIA reversed. 60 Instead of following one of
the existing precedential approaches for identifying social
group, the BIA created a "new" framework composed of four
points: immutable characteristic, voluntary association, impor-
tant societal attribute, and how the members were viewed as a
group by the persecutors. 61 Although most courts followed the
"immutable characteristic" standard for social group laid out in
Matter of Acosta, the BIA held that this was only a "starting
point."62 While Alvarado's social group met the immutable
characteristic test because her sex/gender could not be
changed, 63 the BIA additionally looked to the "voluntary associ-
ation" test, an examination followed by only one circuit court of
appeals.64 The "voluntary association" test departed from Mat-
ter of Acosta in that it identified:
a collection of people closely affiliated with each
other, who are actuated by some common impulse
or interest. Of central concern is the existence of
a voluntary associational relationship among the
purported members, which imparts some common
characteristic that is fundamental to their identity
as a member of that discrete social group. 65
The BIA ruled that Alvarado did not demonstrate that "victims
of spouse abuse view themselves as members of [a] group," and
therefore, did not meet the "voluntary association" test.66 The
BIA also held that social groups under the asylum definition
must include "an important social attribute" with clearly identi-
fiable divisions between members of the group and larger soci-
ety, and determined that because domestic violence was not
culturally important or pervasive in Guatemala, it did not meet
this requirement. 67 Finally, the BIA held that it was necessary
60 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 907.
61 Id. at 917-18; Schaffer, supra note 59, at 791.
62 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 919; Schaffer, supra note 59, at 790.
63 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918; Schaffer, supra note 59, at 790.
64 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917-18; Schaffer, supra note 59, at 790.
65 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
66 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918.
67 Schaffer, supra note 59, at 791.
55
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that the claimed social group be recognized as separate by larger
society and the persecutor in order to ensure that the social
group ground was treated similarly to the other four protected
grounds.68
Regardless of the outcome of the social group determination,
the BIA further ruled that even if Alvarado had established
membership in a particular social group, she did not prove that
the persecution was motivated by her membership in that social
group.69 Because Alvarado's husband did not target any other
members of the proposed group, there was no proof that similar
individuals were at risk.70 The BIA reasoned that if her husband
were truly motivated by the protected ground, then he would
have acted against other Guatemalan women in the same
group.71
After the decision was published, advocacy initiatives began
throughout the United States. Amnesty International released a
Refugee Action;72 additionally, the Congressional Hispanic
Caucus,73 five senators,74 and other members of the House and
Senate sent letters to Attorney General Reno requesting certifi-
cation. Advocates and lawyers argued that the definitions used
to determine the case were inconsistent with both prior prece-
dent and the intentions of asylum law, and that action was nec-
essary to prevent future cases from following the same flawed
logic. 75 The case generated such public response that an attempt
was made to address the issue of domestic violence asylum in
68 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918; Schaffer, supra note 59, at 791.
69 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917-19; Schaffer, supra note 59, at 789.
70 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 920; Schaffer, supra note 59, at 791-92.
71 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 920; Schaffer, supra note 59, at 791-92.
72 Amnesty Int'l, Refugee Action, NSA 6/99 (May 25, 1999), available at
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/advocacy/ai-dv5-99.pdf.
73 Letter from Luis Gutierrez, et. al., Congressional Hispanic Caucus, to Ja-
net Reno, Attorney Gen. (July 22, 1999) (supporting Ms. Alvarado's asylum
claim and requesting certification of Matter of R-A-), http://cgrs.uchastings.
edu/documents/advocacy/congress_1tr_1999.pdf.
74 Letter from Robert G. Torricelli et. al., U.S. Senators, to Janet Reno, At-
torney Gen. (Dec. 2, 1999) (expressing concern about Matter of R-A-), http://
cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/advocacy/senate_12-99.pdf.
75 See id.
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the waning days of the Clinton administration with the proposal
of new regulations.
C. Proposed 2000 Regulations: Trying to Create Space for
Domestic Violence Victims
On December 7, 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS")76 released a proposed rule to amend the asylum
regulations.77 Largely in response to the advocacy in the wake
of Matter of R-A-, Attorney General Janet Reno and the INS
Commissioner suggested the change in regulations to address
"certain aspects of the Matter of R-A- decision that might be
read to be inconsistent with principles of asylum law, and that
could impose unwarranted barriers to claims based on domestic
violence."78 Specifically designed to modify the outcome in
Matter of R-A-, but applicable to all asylum cases, the proposed
regulations clarified the definitions of "persecution," "member-
ship in a particular social group," and "on account of."7 9 The
regulations "establishe[d] principles for interpretation and ap-
plication of the various components of the statutory definition
of 'refugee' for asylum . .. cases generally, and, in particular,...
claims made by applicants who have suffered or fear domestic
violence."80
The proposed regulations clarified that "persecution" is both
objective and subjective.81 They explained that persecution
should require "infliction of objectively serious harm or suffer-
76 The INS was dissolved in March of 2003, and its duties were redistributed
to USCIS, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection ("CBP"), both under the DHS. USCIS now
releases proposed asylum and immigration regulations.
77 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed Dec.
7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
78 Press Release, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., Questions and An-
swers: The R-A- Rule, (Dec. 7, 2000) (on file with author), available at http://
www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/R-A-Rule_120700.pdf.
79 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,588; Press Release, Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
supra note 78.
80 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,588.
81 Id. at 76,590, 76,595.
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ing" and must be "experienced as serious harm by the applicant,
regardless of whether the persecutor intends to cause harm." 8 2
It should not require "malignant" or "punitive" intent.83 The
proposed regulations also suggested language that would re-
quire applicants to demonstrate that the protected ground was
"central to the persecutor's motivation to act." 8 4 Applicants
could meet this centrality requirement by demonstrating that
persecution is "on account of the applicant's race, religion, na-
tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion, or on account of what the persecutor perceives to be
the applicant's race, religion, nationality, membership in a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion."85 The regulations also
sought to establish the idea that courts could look to evidence
that the alleged persecutor acted against other persons sharing
this protected ground, but that such action was unnecessary to
demonstrate causation.86
Finally, the proposed regulations codified the "immutable
characteristic" doctrine set forth in Matter of Acosta and further
clarified that gender is an immutable trait that should be ac-
cepted within the doctrine (even pointing out that marital status
could be immutable in some situations).87 They reiterated a
longstanding concept that social group cannot be defined by the
harm claimed.88 In direct opposition to the BIA ruling in Matter
of R-A-,89 they also included "a non-exclusive list of additional
factors that may be considered in determining whether a partic-
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,592. It did not remove the doctrine of mixed motives
(that motive could be partially due to status and partially private, protected
ground did not have to be only reason). Id. This idea was codified in the
Real ID Act as the "one central reason" doctrine." Real ID Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)).
85 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,592.
86 Id. at 76,598.
87 Id. at 76,593-95.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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ular social group exists,"90 and explicitly stated that these factors
were not required.91
In light of continued advocacy and the proposed regulations,
on January 18, 2001, Attorney General Reno certified Matter of
R-A- to herself and vacated the BIA decision, remanding the
case to the BIA pending final form of the regulations.92 While
the proposed regulations did go through the official comment
process, 93 the Clinton administration left the White House with-
out finalizing the regulations, and the Bush administration did
not publish or release either draft or final regulations. Despite
this stagnation, agents of the DOJ continued to refer to the pro-
posed regulations, in one instance stating in court that the pro-
posed regulations were the best definition of "refugee" it had,
and that this definition could be used in asylum cases. 94
D. International Action: 2002 UNHCR Guidelines
The United States was not the only country struggling with
clarifying the concepts of social group and trying to develop a
framework to fairly and consistently adjudicate gender asylum
claims. On May 7, 2002, UNHCR released two separate sets of
guidelines addressing gender and social group in an attempt to
give guidance to individual countries.95 UNHCR released the
gender-related persecution guidelines to recognize a range of
gender-related asylum claims and to help guarantee that women
and homosexuals would receive fair assessment of their asylum
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001, B.I.A. 1999).
93 Press Release, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., supra note 78.
94 Brief on Behalf of Rodi Alvarado Pehia to the Attorney General of the
United States, In re R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005) [hereinafter Peti-
tioner's Brief], available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/legal/ra
briefjfinal.pdf.
95 Gender Guidelines, supra note 10; Social Group Guidelines, supra note 41.
While not binding on United States courts, guidelines and other UNHCR
rules are subject to deference, and help to shape the international consensus
and approach to asylum and refugee issues. See INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 438-39 (1987).
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claims. 96 In a non-exclusive list outlining the types of gender-
related persecution, UNHCR included violence recognized by
the U.S. as persecution, such as female genital mutilation and
the less accepted category of family or domestic violence.97 The
guidelines also detailed a number of other gender-related issues
that could trigger an asylum claim, including persecutory laws,
extreme gender discrimination, sex trafficking, and persecution
based on sexual orientation. 98
Acknowledging social group as "the ground with the least
clarity," the social group guidelines sought to better define the
category-especially given its increased use.99 The guidelines
combined two approaches to social group to avoid gaps in
coverage or applicability-"immutability" and "social
perception: "100
a particular social group is a group of persons who
share a common characteristic other than their
risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a
group by society. The characteristic will often be
one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is
otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or
the exercise of one's human rights.O1
The guidelines specifically indicated that sex can be considered
within social group, given that "women [are] a clear example of
a social subset defined by innate and immutable characteristics,
and who are frequently treated differently to men." 1 0 2 The
guidelines rejected the "voluntary association" test of self-iden-
tifying due to a perceived shared characteristic, as set forth in
Sanchez-Trujillo, and stated that not all members of a group
must be at risk of persecution to be protected as a social
group.103 Finally, the social group guidelines also detailed that
96 Gender Guidelines, supra note 10.
97 See id. at 91 3, 9.
98 Id. at [$ 15-19.
99 Social Group Guidelines, supra note 41, at $ 1.
100 Id. at 6-7.
101 Id. at 11.
102 Id. at 12.
103 Id. at 1 17.
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motivation could be established in cases involving non-state ac-
tors by demonstrating that the State was unwilling or unable to
extend protection because of an individual's membership in a
social group or another protected ground. 10 4
E. Matter of R-A- in 2004: The DHS Brief
Despite local and international advocacy, Matter of R-A- re-
mained on the back burner. On February 21, 2003, Attorney
General John Ashcroft also requested to have Matter of R-A-
certified to him.105 Initially, Ashcroft denied Alvarado's re-
quests to brief the issues and to clarify the status of the pro-
posed rule, but after sixty-two members of the House of
Representatives demonstrated their support of the request, he
ordered briefs from both DHS and Alvarado's lawyers.10 6 The
brief presented on behalf of Alvarado argued that she met the
social group immutability test as laid out in Matter of Acosta due
to her gender, marital status, and nationality.107 The persecution
was "on account of" Alvarado's social group; she was perse-
cuted because she was her persecutor's wife, which related to
both her gender and marital status. 08 The brief also argued that
the motivation for the persecution could be demonstrated by
looking at the societal and cultural norms and that "[t]he legal
system in Guatemala supports the patterns of violence by abdi-
cat ing [sic] its responsibility to intervene to protect victims of
domestic battering."109
At first glance, the DHS brief appeared to be a positive move-
ment toward establishing equitable bases to decide domestic vi-
olence asylum cases, but it included a number of ideas that
104 Id.
105 Petitioner's Brief, supra note 94, at 3.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 9.
tos Id. at 17 ("[His] animus was not personal to her as an individual, but
directed towards her as his wife; when directly questioned on this point, she
testified that her husband would batter any woman to whom he was
married."),
109 Id. at 19.
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undermined its impact. The DHS brief supported granting Al-
varado asylum, arguing that she "met the statutory requirements
for asylum" and "that there [were] no adverse factors that
would warrant denial of asylum." 10 DHS did not want the deci-
sion in Alvarado's case to be precedential, however, because it
wanted to avoid influencing the outcome of future applications
and cases.111 In fact, DHS requested that the Attorney General
remand the case to BIA for a finding of asylum without an opin-
ion and without affirming the immigration judge's decision in
order to prevent such an outcome.112 If that was not possible,
DHS requested that the Attorney General postpone issuing a
decision until publication of the final version of the proposed
regulations.113 If a precedential decision could not be avoided,
only then would DHS request a narrow decision based on its
argument in the brief, which would be "consistent with existing
law," and that the Attorney General not enter an opinion that
would further the development of immigration law.114
DHS did not reject the concept that victims of domestic asy-
lum could (in some cases) qualify for asylum outright. While it
defended some arguments from the 1999 decision in order to
limit the individuals who could qualify for asylum, however, it
rejected others. DHS confirmed the BIA's ruling that the social
group formulated by the immigration judge ("Guatemalan
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan
male companions, who believe that women are to live under
male domination") did not qualify as an asylum claim.115 Yet,
instead of requesting dismissal of the claim on that basis, it ar-
ticulated a group that it believed did meet the requirements:
110 Brief of Department of Homeland Security's Position on Respondent's
eligibility for Relief at 2-3, In re R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005)
[hereinafter DHS Brief], available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/documents/
legal/dhs-briefjra.pdf.
to Id. at 2. Only published decisions are precedential. Many immigration
cases have only verbal decisions, and cannot be used in future cases, a
marked difference from other areas of law.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 3.
115 Id. at 18.
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"married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave the re-
lationship."116 DHS relied on Matter of Acosta to define mem-
bership in a particular social group because not only was the
decision in that case well respected and followed in numerous
U.S. and international cases, but the standard articulated in that
case was "sound and well supported" when compared with other
tests.117
The brief did incorporate other ideas from the 1999 ruling
that women's rights and domestic violence advocates had fought
against. DHS did not dismiss the new factors laid out in the
BIA's decision, Matter of R-A-, which required a recognized fac-
tion of society and important societal attribute.118 Instead, it an-
alyzed the social group definition articulated in Matter of R-A-
and found that the newly proposed group met these factors.119
Guatemalan country conditions demonstrated that domestic vi-
olence is considered a "family problem," so that being a wife
means that a woman "will not be accorded protection from
harm inflicted by a spouse."12 0 It argued that this "important
characteristic" created a recognized segment of society, i.e.
wives.121 DHS also argued that the causation requirement had
been met under INS v. Zacarias and asserted that the BIA re-
quirement of evidence that the persecutor also sought to harm
other members of the identified social group to determine moti-
vation was "fundamentally flawed."122 DHS found that, if ac-
cepted, the BIA's reasoning in Matter of R-A- would have
singled out domestic violence cases based on the reality of how
domestic violence operates and denied applicants protection
when they met all other factors.123 In the domestic violence con-
116 Id. at 19.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 25.
119 Similarly to the proposed regulations, DHS also argued that these "fac-
tors" are not requirements that can exist unrelated to the Acosta rule, but
serve as "indicators" of social group. DHS Brief, supra note 110, at 25.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 34.
123 Id. at 35.
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text, evidence that the abuse is designed to maintain "power and
control" over the victim because of her social position in the
family is relevant in determining motive on a protected
ground.124
While the DHS brief appeared to finally answer the question
of whether victims of domestic violence could, in some cases,
qualify for asylum in the United States in reality, very little
changed. The brief specifically stated that the argument was not
meant to serve as precedent,12 5 and the Attorney General de-
cided to accept DHS's second suggestion that he stay the case
and remand it back to the BIA pending regulations.126 As a re-
sult, not only did the lack of clear rules for domestic violence
cases continue, but Alvarado's own status remained undecided
for another four years until the administration again attempted
to finalize the case without regulations.127
F. Defining Social Group and Developing
Case Law Precedent
Without the publication of the 2000 asylum regulations or a
precedential opinion that clearly delineated the rules regarding
social group and causation in the domestic violence context,
these issues remained open to interpretation. During the final
four years of the Bush administration, a number of BIA cases
(unrelated to domestic violence) limited the value of "member-
ship in a particular social group" as a protected ground even
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Alvarado's case was stayed until 2008 when Attorney General Mukasey
remanded the case to himself, and sent it back to the BIA for consideration
without regulations. In re R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 630 (A.G. 2008). In
October of 2009, DHS again issued a brief, this time in full support of asylum
for Alvarado. See Editorial, Rody Alvarado's Odyssey, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2009. In December of 2009, a one page, unpublished, non-precedential deci-
sion granted Rodi Alvarado asylum. See Elias, supra note 13.
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further.128 The BIA also increased the requirements on appli-
cants to prove their status,129 seemingly moving away from the
standards laid out in both the proposed regulations and the 2004
DHS brief.
Matter of C- A- was one of the first cases to discuss social
group requirements after 2005. In Matter of C- A-, the BIA
found that former informants against a drug cartel could not
qualify for asylum because they did not meet a "social visibility"
standard requiring "highly visible and recognizable" characteris-
tics.130 Soon after, in Matter of A-M-E- and J-G-U-, the BIA
found that a social group must not only be "socially visible," but
must also meet "particularity standards."131 The BIA affirmed
the requirement that the social group be "readily identifiable"
by society at large, and it suggested a particularity restriction
requiring that the boundaries of a social group must be determi-
nate and specific.132
Additional cases continued to reinforce these additional re-
quirements to establish membership in a particular social group.
In Matter of S-E-G-,133 the BIA found that neither Salvadoran
youths resisting gang recruitment nor their families could consti-
128 See In re E- A- G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2007); In re S- E- G-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); In re A- M- E- & J- G- U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69
(B.I.A. 2007); In re C- A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
129 See In re E- A- G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2007); In re S- E- G-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); In re A- M- E- & J- G- U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69
(B.I.A. 2007); In re C- A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
130 In re C- A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 961.
131 In re A- M- E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 73.
132 Id. at 74, 76.
133 The future of Matter of S- E- G- is currently in limbo. See generally Ste-
phen Manning, S-E-G-, Visibility and Invisibility, AILA IMMIGRATION SLIP
OPINION BLOG, Feb. 28, 2010, http://www.ailaslipopinionblog.com/2010/02/
28/s-e-g-visibility-and-invisibility/. The circuit court sent it back to the BIA
along with a number of other cases to be reconsidered. In re: S- E- G-, 2009
WL 5437078 (B.I.A.). However, given that this case is still good law, the BIA
would be bound by the precedent of the very same case while reviewing the
text. There was, at one point, speculation that this case would eventually be
vacated so that the BIA can review it as requested, but as of January 2012
this has not happened.
tute a "particular social group".134 The group in this case was
not particular enough because its definition was too subjective,
the group composed too large and diffuse a segment of society,
and it was not recognized by society as a whole.'3 5 In Matter of
E-A-G-, the companion case to S- E- G-, reinforced that persons
who resist gang membership cannot be a particular social group
because they cannot demonstrate that society perceives them as
a distinct group that has been persecuted for their group mem-
bership, even if characteristics of the group are identifiable.136 If
membership itself could not be a social group, a mistaken belief
about membership would not suffice.'37
In September of 2008, near the end of the Bush administra-
tion, Attorney General Mukasey lifted the stay on Matter of R-
A-, remanded it to the BIA for consideration and waived the
requirement to wait for the publication of the proposed regula-
tions.138 He argued that given the recent cases defining "perse-
cution," "on account of," and "particular social group," enough
consistent precedent had accrued to rule on the case without the
regulations.139 Because Matter of R-A- had been litigated prior
to the cases mentioned and no evidence regarding social visibil-
ity or particularity had been submitted, the BIA agreed to re-
mand the case back to the Immigration Court in order to
develop the arguments and facts further.140 While advocates on
behalf of Alvarado remained confident in their well-developed
case, many were concerned that a death knell had rung not only
for victims of domestic violence - but for the social group cate-
gory as a whole.141
134 In re S- E- G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 585, 590.
135 Id. at 584-87.
136 In re E- A- G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A. 2007).
137 Id. at 596.
138 In re R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 630 (A.G. 2008).
139 Id.
140 Documents and Information on Rody Alvarado's Claim for Asylum in the
U.S., CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., http://cgrs.uchastings.edul
campaigns/alvarado.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).
141 Id.
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G. April 2009 L-R- Brief
In July of 2009, The New York Times received a copy of a
brief submitted by DHS in a pending asylum case before the
BIA.142 Although redacted to protect the anonymity of the ap-
plicant, known only as L-R-, the brief appeared to reflect a
change from the recent position on asylum for victims of domes-
tic violence, and it concluded that such individuals could qualify
for asylum, provided that they meet the other standards. 143 One
editorial hailed the move as a signal of new hope for the future
and a chance to right a wrong by finally looking at domestic
violence asylum cases with "reasoned compassion," 14 4 and an-
other author commented that this move was the end of a jour-
ney that could be compared to Homer's Odyssey.145 Others
were unsure that this move signaled any significant change. 146
The renewed media attention highlighted the continued fight to
establish an equitable and consistent approach to dealing with
domestic violence asylum claims, and calls for regulations in-
creased considerably in 2009.147
In many ways, the facts of L-R- mirror those of Matter of R-
A-. L- R- was a thirty-eight year old citizen of Mexico who fled
her common-law husband after nearly twenty years of abuse.148
The facts of her declaration in support of asylum read like a
142 Julia Preston, New Policy Permits Asylum for Battered Women, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2009.
143 Id. (returning to ideas closer to those laid out in the 2004 Alvarado brief,
which had never been consistently followed in the case law).
144 Editorial, Asylum for Battered Women, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at
WK9.
145 Esta Soler and Karen Musalo, Time to End an Asylum Limbo for Abused
Women, WASH. POST, July 18, 2009, at A15.
146 Sandra Hernandez, Doubts Linger on Asylum: Key Hurdle Removed for
Battered Women, DAILY JOURNAL, July 20, 2009. Years of changing perspec-
tives and near misses seem to justify such a negative stance, especially since
the change does not seem to have been communicated to Immigration attor-
neys or judges.
147 See Tara Bahrampour, Clearer Rules Urged For Asylum Seekers: System
Fails to Protect Women, Study Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2009, at A6.
148 Amended Declaration of L- R- in Support of Application for Asylum at
2, Matter of L-R- (B.I.A. Dec. 30, 2005) [hereinafter Amended Declaration],
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horror story.149 After being raped at gunpoint by a teacher and
coach at her school who had threatened to kill her family if she
did not submit,150 L-R- was forced to live with her abuser, even-
tually establishing a common-law marriage.'51 After she was
caught trying to leave her husband and town while pregnant
with her first child, he attempted to burn her alive in her bed. 152
The abuse continued for years, both privately and publicly. 53
Although L- R- reported the beatings and attacks to the local
police a number of times, no action was taken because it was
considered a private matter.'54 The abuse escalated, continuing
even after L- R- left the marriage and tried to live apart from
her husband.1s5 Only her final flight to the United States
seemed to stop him.15 6
After being denied asylum for herself and her children by an
immigration judge in 2007, the case of L-R- was appealed to the
BIA, which requested subsequent briefing in December of
2008.157 In its brief, DHS recommended that the case be re-
manded back to the immigration court to develop further evi-
dence.158 But the stance of DHS did indicate some changes
from the recent social group cases.159 The brief best represents
DHS's current position regarding whether victims of domestic
violence "are members of a particular social group within the
meaning of the [Refugee] Act," and therefore, eligible for asy-
lum.160 Although DHS claimed that the proposed 2000 regula-
tions had not been abandoned, it sought to address not only the
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/us/20090716-asylum-
support.pdf.
149 Id. at 4-6.
150 Id. at 7.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 8.
'53 Id. at 9.
154 Id.
'55 Id. at 10-25.
156 Id.
157 Supplemental Brief, supra note 11 at 2-3.
158 Id. at 21.
159 Id. at 7-10.
160 Id. at 2-5.
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social group argument proposed by L- R-, but also what formu-
lations could meet the asylum qualifications going forward.161
Arguing that more evidence was necessary to determine if these
formulations applied to the current case, DHS recommended
that the case be remanded to the immigration court once the
BIA "issued its ruling and clarified the governing doctrine."16 2
In setting out the requirements for social group, DHS reiter-
ated established ideas including "that a particular social group
cannot be significantly defined by the persecution suffered or
feared," 6 3 and it argued that suggested definitions cannot use
circular reasoning to establish social group.164 The brief under-
scored that Matter of Acosta remained the "seminal decision"
for social group and immutable characteristic as the standard;165
however, DHS also recognized the additional considerations re-
garding visibility and particularity.166 These ideas rehashed
ground covered not only in previous cases, but also in the 2004
Matter of R-A- brief.
In the April 2009 L-R brief, DHS focused less on whether or
not abuse was motivated by membership in a particular social
group, and instead, focused on the requirements for establishing
social group. While Matter of R-A-, the 2000 regulations, and
the 2004 brief all debated whether action taken against a spouse
was related to their membership in a particular group,167 the is-
sue was only briefly addressed in the April 2009 L-R- brief. 6 8
According to the brief, if L-R-, as a victim of domestic violence,
could establish that her husband believed that women had a
subordinate position in a domestic relationship, and that societal
161 Id. at 11-14.
162 Id. at 5.
163 Id. at 10.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 7.
166 Id. at 8-10.
167 See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001, B.I.A. 1999); DHS Brief
supra note 110; 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,588.
168 Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 12.
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expectations in Mexico reinforced that idea, then she could es-
tablish a particular social group. 169
H. Gatimi v. Holder: Redefining Social Group
In August of 2009, Judge Posner of the 7th Circuit Court of
Appeals called into question the decision to revisit R-A- (based
on the cases detailed in Part II.G) when he vacated and re-
manded a BIA asylum decision involving social group.170 Pos-
ner stated that the BIA had not consistently applied precedent
and that the requirement of "social visibility" had resulted in
arbitrary BIA rulings.171
Francis Gatimi was a Kenyan who had participated in an in-
fluential and violent group with "obscure political aims and idio-
syncratic practices."172 Documented evidence demonstrated
that this group, the Mungiki, not only utilized extreme violence
against former members, but also compelled former members
and their female family to undergo female genital mutilation.173
The Mungiki persecuted Gatimi after he left the group in 1999:
members broke into his home several times, killed both his pets
and a servant, destroyed his personal property, and threatened
not only to harm Gatimi, but also to forcibly apply female cir-
cumcision to his wife. 174 Throughout, the police in Kenya were
either unable or unwilling to protect Gatimi or his family.175
While an immigration judge found that the abuse suffered by
Gatimi did not rise to the level of persecution,176 the BIA never
addressed the persecution argument because it held that the for-
mer members of the Mungiki did not meet the requirements to
169 Id. at 15.
170 Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 614-15 (7th Cir. 2009).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 613.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 614.
175 Id.
176 Posner called the immigration judge's definition of the acts against Mr.
Gatimi "absurd." Id.
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establish a social group.'77 In reviewing case law pertaining to
the definition of social group, Posner highlighted that instead of
following the precedent from the Seventh Circuit case of
Sepulveda v. Gonzales,178 whose facts were virtually indistin-
guishable from those in this case, the BIA relied on precedent
requiring social visibility 79 to establish "particular social
group[s]."180 According to Posner, not only did the social visibil-
ity requirement conflict with precedent in Sepulveda and other
cases; it neither made sense nor was clearly applied or de-
fined.' 8' In addition, Posner stated that the BIA had no author-
ity to pick one conflicting precedent decision over another, as
this would "condone arbitrariness and usurp the agency's re-
sponsibilities." 18 2 The court then remanded the case to the
BIA.183
L Revisiting Old Friends
The L-R- brief raised many questions for advocates as to
when standards for domestic violence asylum would be released.
But one question stood out from the rest: why did DHS come
out in support of L-R- and not Rodi Alvarado, whose case had
been pending for nearly ten years? In October of 2009, DHS
issued another brief, this time in full support of asylum for Alva-
rado.1 8 4 The brief was not released to the public, but news re-
ports indicated that it informed the immigration court in San
Francisco that DHS considered Alvarado to be eligible for asy-
lum in the United States.1 8 5
177 Id.
178 Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 770, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2006).
179 See In re E- A- G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2007); In re S- E- G-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); In re C- A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
180 Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 616.
183 Id. at 618.
184 See Editorial, Rody Alvarado's Odyssey, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, at
A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/opinion/09mon3.html.
185 Id.
71
DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GENDER & L.
On December 13, 2009, Alvarado's "odyssey" came to an end.
After more than ten years of abuse in Mexico, and fourteen
years in the United States' immigration system, the San Fran-
cisco immigration court granted Alvarado asylum. 186 The deci-
sion totaled one page,187 a short amount to encapsulate the
debate on asylum for battered women. There was more good
news for at least some victims of domestic violence the following
year. In August of 2010, lawyers for L-R- announced that she
too had been granted asylum.188 Sources from the Obama ad-
ministration have indicated that it is currently developing regu-
lations to formally recognize asylum for victims of domestic
violence.189 Yet, as of this date, despite movement in other, ar-
guably more controversial, areas of immigration law for undocu-
mented individuals; no proposed regulations have been
submitted for comment or review.190
As this brief review indicates, in less than fifteen years the
stance of the United States government regarding domestic vio-
lence asylum changed numerous times. It started with openness
after the INS gender guidelines were introduced in 1995,191 but
then the BIA reversed Matter of R-A- in 1999,192 leaving the sit-
uation bleak. Shortly after that, Attorney General Reno va-
cated the decision and introduced proposed regulations meant
to provide consistent and fair guidelines.193 But changes in ad-
ministration altered the focus, and no clear standards were in-
186 Elias, supra note 13.
187 Id.
188 Julia Preston, Asylum Granted to Mexican Woman in Case Setting Stan-
dard on Domestic Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2012 at A14, available at http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/us/politics/13asylum.html.
189 Id.
190 See Provisional Waivers of Inadmissibility for Certain Immediate Rela-
tives of U.S. Citizens, 77 Fed. Reg. 1040 (proposed Jan. 9, 2012) (to be codi-
fied at 8 C.F.R. pt. 212); Tara Tidwell Cullen, Obama's Newest Prosecutorial
Discretion Initiative: What it means for Immigrants and Families, NAT'L. IM-
MIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (Aug. 24, 2011) http://www.immigrantjustice.org/
bloglobama-prosecutorial discretionannouncement.
191 INS Asylum Gender Guidelines Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
192 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001, B.I.A. 1999).
193 Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (proposed
Dec. 7, 2000) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 208).
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troduced. 1 9 4 As USCIS officers, immigration judges, and
numerous other individuals within the system struggled to issue
rulings without clear guidance, the BIA issued a number of rul-
ings on social groupl 95 that seemed to conflict with the standards
DHS had supported in 2004 and other case law.196 Although the
current administration seems to support asylum for domestic vi-
olence victims and has indicated that it will promulgate regula-
tions,197 the future is unclear. The last fifteen years demonstrate
a chaotic approach to asylum in cases of gender and domestic
violence that has precluded a fair system for applicants.
III. ANALYSIS
Although the United States implemented legislationl 98 and
regulations99 to provide the framework for the asylum system,
they have proven less than effective at establishing a fair and
consistent system for gender asylum, especially in the domestic
violence context. As discussed above, the last fifteen years
spawned many different approaches to gender and domestic vio-
lence grounds for asylum. What appeared to be a positive trend,
starting with the INS gender guidelines and Matter of Kasinga,
was turned on its head when the BIA decided Matter of R-A- in
1999. While subsequent positive changes demonstrated that not
all was lost, a series of negative outcomes in cases limiting the
use of social groups in asylum claims was disheartening for ad-
vocates. This section analyzes the effect that the variation in
these approaches has had on the asylum system.
A. Not All News is Bad News
Despite the frustrations and inadequacies of the system, there
have been some successes for victims of domestic violence seek-
194 See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 105-27 and accompanying text.
197 Elias, supra note 13.
198 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006).
199 8 C.F.R. pt. 208 (2011).
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ing asylum in the United States. In December of 2009, Rodi
Alvarado received asylum status in the United States. 200 Be-
cause L-R- also received asylum in August of 2010, the April
2009 L-R- brief arguing that victims of domestic violence could
receive asylum in certain cases can be viewed as DHS policy
under the Obama administration. 201 The idea that a victim must
demonstrate that her persecutor targeted other individuals from
her purported social group is no longer accepted by the immi-
gration courts or the BIA.2 0 2 In addition, a spokesperson for the
Obama Administration continues to claim that new regulations
for asylum will soon be introduced.203 The United States still
has not completely embraced asylum for victims of domestic vi-
olence: there are no regulations detailing important definitions,
the case precedent is contradictory, and the "promise" of the
DHS briefs submitted in the cases of Alvarado and L-R- is noth-
ing on which to rely.2 0 4 Notwithstanding these problems, certain
changes should be recognized for their beneficial impact.
One positive change for victims of domestic violence is the
narrowing number of recognized standards associated with so-
cial group claims. The 1999 BIA decision in Matter of R-A- cre-
ated a nearly impossible standard for domestic violence
asylum.205 It imposed multiple additional tests for determining
social group definitions; increasing the specificity of social group
to a level where few applicants (if any) could successfully use
"membership in a particular social group" as a protected
ground.206 Then, the 2000 proposed regulations took the addi-
tional requirements of Matter of R-A- (self-identification, recog-
nition as a group by larger society, and identification because of
an important characteristic) and lessened their impact by mak-
ing them optional support statements. 207 While not binding, the
200 Elias, supra note 13.
201 See Martin, supra note 11; Preston, supra note 188.
202 DHS Brief, supra note 110, at 30-34.
203 Elias, supra note 13.
204 Supplemental Brief, supra note 11; DHS Brief, supra note 110.
205 See In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001, B.I.A. 1999).
206 See id. at 917-19; Schaffer, supra note 59, at 790-91.
207 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,593-35.
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proposed regulation did have some effect on immigration courts
given that Matter of R-A had already been vacated. The 2002
UNHCR Social Group Guidelines also rejected the "voluntary
association" test, stating that it did not reflect the intent of the
1951 Convention, and the majority of circuit courts in the
United States do not accept it.208 Another small victory oc-
curred in 2009 when Judge Posner challenged the additional
tests that the BIA added on top of the immutable characteristic
test,209 arguing that they were inconsistent with previous prece-
dents and can, in some cases, unfairly deny protection.210 While
the issue of what satisfies the "social group ground" is not yet
resolved, asylum applicants in the Seventh Circuit have a far
better chance of dictating a sufficient social group definition to-
day than they did in either 1999 or 2008.
Another aspect of the R-A- decision that no longer applies is
the requirement that applicants demonstrate evidence that their
alleged persecutor singled out other individuals from the same
social group in order to prove that the social group was the mo-
tivation for the persecution.211 Given that domestic violence is,
by definition, violence within a family unit, that BIA ruling
would have effectively barred domestic violence asylum cases.
In response to Matter of R-A-, the proposed regulations quickly
rejected this requirement, indicating that such proof could be
provided in some cases, but should never be mandatory. 212 By
2004, DHS argued in its brief that the "on account of" reasoning
of the 1999 BIA decision was "fundamentally flawed" in deny-
ing that the persecution was motivated by group membership
because no other group members had been harmed. 213 By the
time DHS submitted its April 2009 Brief, this line of reasoning
had effectively been abandoned and DHS never attempted to
208 Social Group Guidelines, supra note 41, at 4.
209 Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009).
210 See id. at 616.
211 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917-19; Schaffer, supra note 59, at 790-91.
212 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,592-93.
213 DHS Brief, supra note 110, at 32.
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argue that other group members must also be targeted by the
same persecutor.2 14
Grants of asylum for Rodi Alvarado and L-R- are perhaps the
most valuable victories for victims of domestic violence. The
case of L-R- is especially helpful, given that DHS clearly indi-
cated its position on a number of issues in its trial brief and that
the immigration judge subsequently granted the case in the vic-
tim's favor. 2 15 Although it is difficult to track because individual
asylum decisions made at local offices or by immigration judges
at trial are rarely recorded, anecdotal evidence seems to indicate
an increase in pro-victim adjudications. 216 What little can be
seen at the BIA and circuit court level seems to indicate that
asylum is a possibility within the system, even if the outcomes
and standards are not always clear.217
B. The Problem With Flexibility
Despite the victories in immigration courts over the past dec-
ade, the problems facing domestic violence asylum continue.
No definition for "membership in a particular social group" ex-
ists in either the asylum legislation or the implementing regula-
tions.218 Because of this, the system can only rely on court
decisions, agency interpretations, and guidelines from outside
sources to formulate standards for adjudicating individual asy-
lum cases. Perhaps the purpose of the Refugee Act when it was
214 See generally Supplemental Brief, supra note 11.
215 Id.; Preston, supra note 188.
216 Chicago immigration attorneys have informally indicated that they are
seeing pro-victim adjudications both in defensive asylum applications during
removal proceedings and in those applications which are routed through the
Chicago asylum office. But this author cannot refer to any particular cases
because no formal study of adjudications has been done and confidentiality
limits information available about these cases.
217 See Fonseca-Arauz v. Holder, 439 Fed. App'x. 573, 574-75 (9th Cir.
2011); BIA Remands for Further Fact Finding in Domestic Violence Asylum
Case, AILA Doc. No. 11062864 (June 28, 2011) (redacted copy of BIA deci-
sion remanding domestic violence asylum case to immigration judge for de-
velopment of factual record).
218 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 208 (2009).
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first introduced, was to create flexibility, but it has led to con-
fused applicants, inconsistent adjudication, conflicting prece-
dent, and a concentration of unregulated power in the hands of
individual USCIS officers and immigration judges-all of which
could be avoided with the introduction of new regulations.
The lack of clear standards makes it difficult for asylum appli-
cants and their representatives to understand how to structure
their applications and cases. With each change in DHS policy,
or new case decision, the standards fluctuate. For example, the
1999 BIA decision in Matter of R-A-219 broke with previous in-
terpretations from Matter of Acosta220 and Matter of Kasinga221
and introduced its own four part definition of social group.222
The opinion did not overrule either Acosta or Kasinga, but it
introduced standards that would result in different outcomes.223
At the same time that the BIA created a new standard, other
divisions existed. The Ninth Circuit court followed the "volun-
tary association" test, in contrast to the Matter of Acosta stan-
dard.2 2 4 As a result, at least four different approaches to social
group existed: Matter of Acosta, voluntary association (Sanchez-
Trujillo), Matter of Kasinga, and Matter of R-A-. Attorney Gen-
eral Reno's vacation of Matter of R-A- did nothing to end this
confusion. It removed the offensive opinion, but that act is not
the most appropriate vehicle for clarifying definitions because it
only highlights how easily case precedent can change something
as vital as a definition.
Because they are not binding in the United States, interna-
tional standards are also largely ineffective at regulating the def-
inition of social group. Although the 2002 Social Group and
Gender guidelines were instituted partially in response to the
situation in the United States and the problems with the R-A-
219 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001, B.I.A. 1999).
220 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), modified on other
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
221 In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
222 In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917-19.
223 Id.
224 Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986); In re R-A-,
22 I. & N. Dec. at 917-19; Schaffer, supra note 59, at 790-91.
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decision, they were unsuccessful in establishing definitions.225
Despite the fact that UNHCR released the guidelines to ensure
that asylum definitions did not become overly restrictive,226 the
guidelines were referenced within later social group cases that
limited the use of the "membership in a particular social group"
ground.227 In the absence of a single standard, each and every
victim of domestic violence would have to try to frame social
groups that satisfied each of the different aspects of the varied
definitions. Victims would have no way of knowing which stan-
dard will be applied.
Because DHS is the agency that actually prosecutes cases in
immigration courts, its perspective on the definition of social
group within the briefs mentioned could be considered indica-
tive of government policy. The DHS briefs in the cases of L-R-
and Rodi Alvarado, however, have not provided a clear under-
standing of how DHS itself views this issue. While DHS sup-
ported a more inclusive definition of social group in those
briefs,228 its prosecutors pushed restrictive interpretations in
other social group cases at the same time. 2 2 9 In addition, the
lack of any precedential cases confirming the positions that
DHS put forward in cases like those of Rodi Alvarado and L-R-
reduces the impact of this "policy." There is nothing to prevent
the prosecution at any moment from arguing a different position
as to whether domestic violence victims can constitute a particu-
lar social group; new briefs in a new case would be all that it
would take to reverse these gains.
Inconsistency in gender and domestic violence case decisions
also increases inefficiency in the system. Because neither asy-
225 See Gender Guidelines, supra note 10; Social Group Guidelines, supra
note 41.
226 See Gender Guidelines, supra note 11.
227 See generally In re E- A- G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2007); In re S- E-
G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); In re A- M- E- & J- G- U-, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007); In re C- A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
228 See generally Supplemental Brief, supra note 11.
229 See generally Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009); In re E-
A- G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591; In re S- E- G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579; In re A- M- E-
J- G- U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69; In re C- A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951.
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lum applicants, nor defense counsel, nor (in some cases) the
prosecution has a clear idea of what the standards call for, many
cases are appealed to higher courts and remanded down to
lower courts numerous times.230 Some cases are used as binding
precedent in later cases, only to be remanded themselves, result-
ing in an unending loop and an ever increasing number of cases
needing additional review.231 Resources are wasted in appeals
contesting outcomes that result as much from unclear defini-
tions of a social group as they do from judicial error or
prejudice. Widespread use of detention within the immigration
system, and its existence as an automatic default in removal
cases, means that the majority of asylum seekers remain de-
tained throughout the application, trial, and appeals process-
increasing the potential burden on the federal system when
these individuals could be with family or friends working to es-
tablish themselves in the United States.
C. Regulations are the Cure
Domestic Violence Asylum cases, specifically Matter of R-A-,
fell from the headlines after the case was again stayed in 2005.232
Other social group cases such as those involving gangs or infor-
mants took precedence. 233 While they had a strong impact on
how domestic violence cases were adjudicated, the focus ap-
peared to shift away from domestic violence asylum. In Septem-
ber of 2008, when Attorney General Mukasey remanded Matter
of R-A- to the BIA,234 it appeared that the Bush administration
might have been trying to settle the case before his successor
took office. While the April 2009 DHS Brief did not suggest the
230 Matter of R-A- is a good example of this phenomenon.
231 See In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec 579; Press Release, Nat'l Immigrant
Justice Ctr., Immigrant Rights Organizations Ask U.S. Attorney General to
Overturn Immigration Agency's Denial of Asylum for Youth Who Fled
Gangs in El Salvador (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.immigrantjustice.org/press
releases/immigrant-rights-organizations-ask-us-attorney-general-overturn-
immigration-agencys-d.
232 In re R-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005).
233 See supra notes 129-137 and accompanying text.
234 In re R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
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most progressive attitude toward domestic violence asylum
claims, it was pivotal because it signaled that the negative ap-
proach seen under the Bush administration might have finally
changed course.
The publication of Julia Preston's New York Times article in
July of 2009 and the release of the redacted L-R- DHS brief
brought domestic violence asylum back into the news and onto
the advocates' policy agendas. 235 Since July 2009, numerous ar-
ticles have been published in both mainstream and asylum me-
dia advocating for more consistent and fair standards. 236 In
October 2009, DHS submitted a one paragraph brief recom-
mending that Rodi Alvarado be granted asylum, potentially
closing her case after fourteen years. 237 When contacted by the
media, DHS officials stated that it "continues to view domestic
violence as a possible basis for asylum," and an asylum lawyer at
the law firm Howard Rice thought that combined with the brief
in L-R-, the recent filing provides solid guidelines for the
courts.2 3 8 Alvarado was in fact granted asylum in December of
2010.239
But despite these positive changes, domestic violence claims
will remain in limbo until legislation or regulations are insti-
tuted. The lack of any precedential, or even published, cases on
how victims of domestic violence can attain asylum within the
United States underscores this problem. Nothing exists to state
an official position on this issue within the asylum offices, the
235 Preston, supra note 188.
236 See, e.g., Asylum Aid, WOMEN's ASYLUM NEWS (Sept. 16, 2009), availa-
ble at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ablec3O2.html; Bahrampour,
supra note 147; Hernandez, supra note 146; Editorial, supra note 144; Soler,
supra note 145.
237 Department of Homeland Security's Response to the Respondent's Sup-
plemental Filing of August 18, 2009, In re R-A- (B.I.A. Oct. 28, 2009), availa-
ble at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20091030asylum
brief.pdf; See also Julia Preston, U.S. May Be Open to Asylum for Spouse
Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/30/us/30
asylum.html.
238 Preston, supra note 188.
239 Elias, supra note 13.
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trial courts, the BIA, or any other area under the executive
branch.
The Department of Justice regulations proposed in 2000
presented a progressive view of social group and gender asylum
for the first time.240 DHS held a very similar position in both
2004 and 2009.241 Yet neither the Clinton nor the Bush adminis-
trations implemented a policy allowing for consistent adjudica-
tions. The beneficial spirit of the last few years will dissipate
again unless formal rules are put in place that can survive both
the next circuit court case and the next administration.
An effective, institutionalized framework for domestic vio-
lence asylum is necessary. Although this framework may spring
from either the judicial or legislative branches of government,
both seem unlikely. To date, no precedential decisions exist that
would clearly indicate that victims of domestic violence are eligi-
ble for asylum, despite actions such as the recent filing of an
amicus curiae brief by the American Society of Immigration
Lawyers that clearly state how existing law could and should be
applied.242 Other asylum cases involving social group seem to
stymie the BIA and split the circuit courts, and there has been
very little indication that the Supreme Court would be ready or
willing to take up this issue when there is so much else that goes
unaddressed. Help from Congress also appears unlikely. Even
the most innocent and well supported immigration initiatives,
such as the DREAM Act, have sputtered and failed in the legis-
lative branch due to partisan politics and anti-immigrant senti-
ment.2 4 3 Regulations emanating from the executive branch are
not only the most appropriate and direct way to establish the
240 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,588; Press Release, Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., supra note 78.
241 See Supplemental Brief, supra note 11; DHS Brief, supra note 110.
242 Brief for American Society of Immigration Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondent, Matter of K- C- (Oct. 18, 2011), AILA Doc. No.
11110170 (Nov. 01, 2011).
243 See Lisa Mascaro and James Oliphant, Dream Act's Failure in Senate De-
rails Immigration Agenda, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.
com/2010/dec/19/nation/la-na-dream-act-20101219.
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required framework, but they are likely the only way to do so at
this juncture.
IV. IMPACT
Regulations are needed, but the question remains as to what
form they should take. It is no longer enough to simply promul-
gate the regulations previously proposed in 2000. The past ten
years have proven that those regulations would not have been
adequate, even if they had been effectuated. New regulations
could focus solely on domestic violence, encompass gender asy-
lum issues, or clarify the asylum law generally through defini-
tions that also address gender and social group issues.
Regardless of the specificity of the vehicle chosen for regula-
tions, they must address three issues: membership in a particular
social group, persecution as a result of state action or inaction,
and motivation based on a protected ground.
The sheer number of approaches applied to the meaning of
"membership in a particular social group," and the fact that the
issue continues to be litigated in numerous contexts make defin-
ing and clarifying membership in a particular social group the
most important aspect of any new regulations, whether the ap-
plication is general or domestic violence specific. Social group
as defined in the UNHCR Social Group Guidelines244 provides
a comprehensive understanding that the United States would do
well to adopt in regulations, with certain adjustments. First, the
definition should clearly state that it consists of two parts. The
first should follow Matter of Acosta; if membership in the pro-
posed group is defined by an immutable characteristic, the
group is valid. 2 4 5 If, however, the group is not easily defined by
an immutable characteristic, then courts can look to whether the
group would be cognizable in society.24 6 The definition should
244 Social Group Guidelines, supra note 41, at [ 11.
245 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), modified on other
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987).
246 This should for the most part mirror the clarification in paragraph 13 of
the Social Group Guidelines, supra note 41, however, explicitly stating that
the second portion only applies where an immutable characteristic cannot be
82 DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GENDER & L. [Vol. 2:1
2011] SANCTUARY FOR VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
also clarify that voluntary association, social visibility, and cohe-
siveness are factors that can be looked to when determining
whether a group without an immutable trait should be consid-
ered cognizable. When a group is clearly defined by an immuta-
ble characteristic, such as race, gender, or disability, further
investigation into the second prong and supplementary tests is
unnecessary.
Establishing the definition of and tests for social group will go
a long way in establishing consistent guidelines for asylum adju-
dications. Many asylum applicants struggle to meet the burden-
some proof required by the BIA, and the inconsistency with
which the BIA applies these requirements creates uncertainty.
Victims of domestic violence, such as Rodi Alvarado and L-R-
often have immutable characteristics such as gender and (under
certain circumstances) marital status that would establish their
social group.247 Including the second inquiry of society recogni-
tion only when no immutable characteristic can be found will
ensure that those asylum applicants-whether victims of domes-
tic violence or not-who are members of a social group without
an immutable characteristic-will also receive protection.
New asylum regulations must also clearly define what is
meant by "persecution." The confusion surrounding persecu-
tion is a significant problem for asylees. The 2000 proposed reg-
ulations presented a strong definition of persecution that should
be included in any new regulations. 24 8 Persecution must always
be severe or extreme harm and does not include everything that
may be considered merely offensive. 249 However, the persecu-
tion definition should also continue to support two ideas raised
in Matter of Kasinga: that the persecutor need not have a subjec-
tive intent to harm, and that objective harm as determined by
societal views or practices is sufficient. 250 Clarifying the defini-
demonstrated will help to avoid multiple interpretations. See Social Group
Guidelines, supra note 41 at % 13.
247 Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 16.
248 See 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,588.
249 Id. at 76,589.
250 In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365-66 (B.I.A. 1996).
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tions of persecution in this way would greatly benefit victims of
domestic violence. Not all societies recognize acts amounting to
domestic violence as involving a subjective intent to harm. An
instruction that objective harm is sufficient to establish persecu-
tion will eliminate the possibility that severe abuse is rejected
simply because a persecutor appears to lack a subjective intent
to harm the victim.
Motivation or "on account of" is another area where the defi-
nitions should be clarified and changed. The United States
should formally adopt the bifurcated nexus 2 5 1 approach in order
to fall within international norms and legislation in other major
countries accepting refugees and asylees. The regulations
should mirror the UNHCR decision to expand the understand-
ing of "on account of" in the Social Group Guidelines252 to in-
clude not only the traditional view of persecution motivated by
the protected ground, but also a failure of protection motivated
by the protected ground. This analysis is particularly important
in the domestic violence context because the persecution is
often personal and private, but the failure of state protection is a
result of ingrained social stances, as experts testified in the L-R-
case.2 5 3 The regulations should clarify that the requisite state
action is achieved when the persecution is either perpetrated by
the state, or occurs as a result of the state's complicity with, or
inability to control, a private actor persecutor. 254 They should
also make clear that evidence of patterns of government non-
responsiveness, country conditions, and both direct and circum-
stantial evidence should all be accepted to demonstrate state ac-
tion or inaction.255
Officially adopting the bifurcated approach will benefit the
asylee population at large by providing a clear standard that is
not dependent on the vagaries of individual immigration offi-
251 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
252 Social Group Guidelines, supra note 41, at 1 (using the phrase "for
reasons of").
253 See Preston, supra note 188.
254 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,590.
255 Id. at 76,590-91.
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cials or judges, but is helpful for victims of domestic violence.
Proving state action in cases such as that of Alvarado is often
difficult because the abuser does not typically act on behalf of
the government in cases of domestic abuse. Despite expert tes-
timony to country conditions, 256 state action was not clearly
identified in Alvarado's case, and had her husband not been a
former member of the military,257 she would likely have encoun-
tered more problems. Clearly defining "lack of protection
based on membership in a particular social group" will make it
easier for future victims to establish that the state is complicit in
the behavior of abusers based on findings of de jure and de facto
discrimination against women.
V. CONCLUSION
Every year, new international conflicts, changing govern-
ments, and shifting societal perceptions change the faces of refu-
gees throughout the world. What does not change, however, is
the underlying goal of asylum law: to protect those who have no
other protection. Too often, United States policies on domestic
violence and asylum have failed to protect victimized women
and children. The law formally acknowledges that gender vio-
lence (including domestic violence) forms a potential basis for
asylum in the United States.258 But as the story of Rodi Alva-
rado, the cases, guidelines, and changes in approach over the
past decade make clear-the system does not fulfill that role.
The text on the Statue of Liberty makes a bold promise to those
seeking refuge at its shores, and the United States should work
to guarantee that asylum applicants, arguably the most vulnera-
ble population in the world, can rely on that promise.
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